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1 Introduction
This is a brief survey that describes recent progress and lists some of the open
problems in the area of cooperative games with incomplete information.1 Al-
though a good number of papers have been written since the seminal work of
Wilson (1978), much remains to be done. Game theory is the discipline that
studies interactive strategic situations among players, in which externalities
pervade. Its cooperative part uses models and solution concepts where the
details of such interactions among coalitions of players, while acknowledged,
are usually not described in the analysis.
∗We thank Geoffroy de Clippel and Yusuke Kamishiro for helpful comments.
†Institut Universitaire de France, CEREMADE and LEDa, Université Paris-Dauphine,
francoise.forges@gmail.com
‡Brown University and IMDEA-Social Sciences Institute, roberto serrano@brown.edu
1In particular, our attempt here is not to be exhaustive. We refer the interested reader
to the more comprehensive surveys mentioned at the beginning of Section 2.
1
Two kinds of externalities should be present in a cooperative game with
incomplete information: strategic externalities and informational external-
ities. For a given coalition, the term strategic externalities refers to the
actions of the complement set of players affecting the payoffs of the players
in the coalition. In contrast, for a given coalition, informational externalities
refers to the information held by the complement set of players affecting the
payoffs of the coalition. With few exceptions, the contributions made so far
have ignored strategic externalities altogether, as well as some informational
externalities. This should already give the reader an idea of the vast number
of open problems that lie ahead.
The survey is organized around models rather than around solution con-
cepts. There are many conceptual issues in modeling cooperation among
players with asymmetric information. Indeed, one cannot generally hope to
derive an analog of the characteristic function under complete information.
For instance, if the analysis is performed at the interim stage –that in which
each player has received some private information–, for a given coalition,
how much information is shared among the players in the coalition? Do they
share none of the private information that each of the players has? Do they
share it all? Do they share some, but not all of it? Each of these would
potentially give rise to a different feasible set of payoffs for the coalition,
thereby questioning the use of a single such set, as prescribed by the charac-
teristic function. On the other hand, as is well-known, even if the derivation
of a characteristic function were possible, the (possibly NTU) characteristic
function does not suffice to capture some relevant aspects of the players’ in-
teraction, e.g., strategic externalities across coalitions. For such cases, under
complete information one can resort to the partition function. But in co-
operative games with incomplete information, for the reasons just specified,
one should also question the concept of the partition function.
Characteristic and partition functions alike have the advantage of ab-
stracting from the specific details in the strategic interaction, yet we observe
that addressing those details directly is important in cooperative games with
asymmetric information, and perhaps that is the reason why researchers have
turned to models in which such specifics of the interaction are tracked down
(the consumption bundles in an exchange economy, or the actions taken in
a collective decision problem or a game in strategic form). We turn to each
of these models in the next pages. We start with exchange economies with
asymmetric information, which do not involve any strategic interaction but
allow for arbitrary forms of informational externalities. In section 3, we main-
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tain these features in an abstract game theoretic framework, which can be
viewed as the analog of the NTU characteristic function under incomplete in-
formation: Bayesian cooperative games with orthogonal coalitions. Finally,
section 4 is devoted to cooperation in noncooperative Bayesian games, in
which the players face both informational and strategic externalities.
2 Exchange Economies with Asymmetric In-
formation
Cooperation under asymmetric information has been mostly studied in this
model, which (1) is relevant in view of the connections between competitive
equilibrium and solutions to cooperative games under complete information
such as the core, and (2) is still manageable under incomplete information
due to the absence of strategic externalities.2
The basic model of an exchange economy with asymmetric information is
as follows. Let Ti denote the (finite) set of agent i’s types. The interpretation
is that ti ∈ Ti denotes the private information possessed by agent i. With
N = {1, . . . , n} as the finite set of agents, let TN =
∏
i∈N Ti denote the set of
all information states. We will use the notation t−i to denote (tj)j 6=i. Simi-
larly T−i =
∏
j 6=i Tj, and for each S ⊆ N , TS =
∏
j∈S Tj and T−S =
∏
j /∈S Tj.
We assume that agents have a common prior probability distribution q de-
fined on TN , and that no type is redundant, i.e., q(ti) > 0 for all ti ∈ Ti for
all i.
There are three distinct timeframes at which one can perform the analysis,
the ex ante stage, the interim stage and the ex post stage.3 Suppose that
nature has chosen tN ∈ TN . At the ex ante stage, no agent i ∈ N has been
informed about her type. At the interim stage, each agent i ∈ N knows
her type, ti, and hence, conditional probabilities will be important: for each
i ∈ N and ti ∈ Ti, the conditional probability of t−i ∈ T−i, given ti is denoted
q(t−i | ti). At the ex post stage, every agent i ∈ N knows the information
state tN . We assume von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility, where the
probability weights are the ones just described at each of these three stages.
2See Allen and Yannelis (2001) and Forges, Minelli and Vohra (2002) for previous
surveys.
3Here, we shall concentrate on the first two; see. e.g., Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz
(2000a, b) for results on the ex post stage.
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We assume that there are |L| = l, a finite number of commodities. The
consumption set of agent i is Xi = IR
l
+. Agent i’s utility function in state
tN is denoted ui(xi, tN) : Xi × TN 7→ IR. We sometimes assume a quasilinear
economy: commodity l is a numeraire, the consumption set is Xi = IR
l−1
+ ×IR,
and the utility function is ui(xi, tN) = vi(x
−l
i , tN) + x
l
i. The endowment of
agent i of type ti is ωi ∈ Xi (assumed to be independent of the state –
with this assumption, all private information concerns agents’ preferences
and beliefs.)
We can now define an admissible exchange economy as
E = 〈(ui, Xi, ωi, Ti)i∈N , q〉.
Note first how, as in standard Neoclassical exchange economies with com-
plete information, strategic externalities (called consumption externalities in
this context) are excluded. That is, agent i’s utility function depends on her
own consumption bundle xi only, not on anyone else’s.
For coalition S ⊆ N , a feasible deterministic (state contingent) S-allocation,
x : TN 7→ Rls (where s denotes the cardinality of S), specifies a commodity
bundle for each consumer in S in each state such that
∑
i∈S xi(tN ) ≤
∑
i∈S ωi
for all tN ∈ TN , and satisfying that x(tS, t′−S) = x(tS, t′′−S) for all tS ∈ TS and
for all t′−S, t
′′
−S ∈ T−S.
Note also how the latter assumption is made to exclude one kind of infor-
mational externalities across coalitions, i.e., the set of feasible allocations to
coalition S is independent of the information held by the complement N \S.
On the other hand, the information held by N \ S may affect the utilities
of agents in coalition S, as ui depends on tN = (tS, t−S), so informational
externalities are present.
Denote by AS the set of feasible deterministic state contingent allo-
cations of S. With confusion being avoided by the context, we also use
AS to denote the set of feasible deterministic allocations in a given state:
AS = {(xi) ∈
∏
i∈S Xi|
∑
i∈S xi ≤
∑
i∈S ωi}. Similarly, deterministic state
contingent N -allocations are simply referred to as deterministic allocations,
and the set of such deterministic allocations is denoted by AN .
In environments in which the information state is not verifiable, not even
at the ex post stage, it becomes necessary to impose incentive compatibility
constraints.4 In coalitional settings such as the current one, the notion of
4As also illustrated in the next sections, with ex post verifiability, IC constraints are not
needed, but information revelation is still an issue;.other authors have relied on verifiability
at the interim stage.
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incentive compatibility requires some discussion, particularly when it gets
tangled with information transmission issues.
Let us begin again by considering deterministic allocations. Then, if agent
i of type ti pretends to be of type t
′
i (while all other agents are truthful), she
gets interim utility:
Ui(x, t
′
i | ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
q(t−i | ti)ui(xi(t−i, t′i), (t−i, ti)).
As is standard, denote by Ui(x | ti) = Ui(x, ti | ti).
An S-allocation x ∈ AS is incentive compatible (IC) if for every i ∈ S,
and for every ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(x | ti) ≥ Ui(x, t′i | ti)
for every t′i ∈ Ti \ {ti}. We denote the set of IC S-allocations by A∗S. An
S-allocation x is strictly IC if all these inequalities are strict.
The ex ante stage is simpler in one important respect. With or with-
out incorporating incentive constraints, there is a well defined characteristic
function. One can specify feasible sets of ex ante expected utilities for each
coalition. In this sense, there should be no doubt about what the core means
in ex ante settings. An S-allocation is an ex ante objection to an N -allocation
if every member of the coalition obtains a higher ex ante expected utility as
a result. The ex ante core is the set of N -allocations that have no ex ante
objections. The ex ante IC core is similarly defined, but in it, both the N -
allocations and the S-allocations that may qualify as ex ante objections are
required to satisfy IC.
If one does not need to incorporate incentive constraints, the ex ante
economy so described is simply an Arrow-Debreu economy. Under standard
assumptions, the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocations are in the ex ante
core, and as the economy gets replicated, the Debreu-Scarf argument ap-
plies, with just a reinterpretation of variables, to show that ex ante core
allocations of replica economies converge to Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allo-
cations. With incentive constraints, as shown in Forges, Mertens and Vohra
(2002), the non-emptiness of the ex ante IC core is not so obvious. Even in
quasilinear economies, while general sufficient conditions for non-emptiness
can be found, there are also robust counterexamples to existence. The same
goes for the core convergence question. As Forges, Heifetz and Minelli (2001)
show, core equivalence does not generally hold, although a positive result can
be established under certain conditions. One important question, still open,
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is what would be appropriate definitions of the ex ante core in contexts with
strategic externalities.
At the interim stage we encounter the problem of the definition of the
characteristic function, already described. The literature has studied the
question of what should be an appropriate definition of the interim core for
some time. The first definitions were provided by Wilson (1978). With-
out relying on incentive compatible mechanisms, Wilson (1978) proposes the
coarse core and the fine core. An S-allocation is a coarse objection to an
N -allocation if there exists an informational event E ⊆ TN that is common
knowledge among the players in coalition S over which each player in the
coalition receives a higher interim expected utility. The coarse core is the set
of N -allocations to which there are no coarse objections. An S- allocation is
a fine objection to an N -allocation if there exists an informational event E
such that each player in coalition S receives a higher expected utility condi-
tional on E. The fine core is the set of N -allocations to which there are no
fine objections.
Wilson’s core concepts are a good starting point, in which the information
transmission within the coalition is exogenous (either none in the case of a
coarse objection, or any kind in the case of a fine objection). Wilson (1978)
proves the non-emptiness of the coarse core and provides counterexamples to
the existence of the fine core. Adding incentive compatibility to the analysis,
Vohra (1999) also exhibits examples to show that the IC coarse core may be
empty. Since the IC coarse core includes any notion of interim IC core in
which some information transmission takes place, Vohra’s result presents a
real challenge to core theory.
More recently, based on tools of mechanism design, Serrano and Vohra
(2007) propose a core concept that incorporates endogenous information
transmission. They answer the question of how much information gets trans-
mitted within a coalition by requiring that the event that the objection uses
coincides with the event over which an equilibrium acceptance takes place
for some Bayesian equilibrium of some communication mechanism used by
the coalition. This gives rise to what we refer to as the core with respect
to (w.r.t.) equilibrium blocking. This core, as a function of the class of
mechanisms one allows, reduces to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra
(2005), the virtual utility core of Myerson (2007) and the randomized medi-
ated core of Serrano and Vohra (2007); see also Okada (2009), who adapts
the Serrano-Vohra equilibrium blocking framework to a class of dynamic bar-
gaining games. In general, the exploration of different negotiation procedures
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should be an important vehicle to tackle questions of coalition formation and
stable payoff distribution. These questions, comprising a generalized Nash
program, remain almost entirely unexplored in these settings. Given that we
foresee this as an active area in the coming years, we proceed to details.
Information transmission concerns ruling out some states as impossible,
through the identification of smaller informational events. For an event E ⊆
TN and ti ∈ Ti, let
E−i(ti) = {t−i ∈ T−i | (ti, t−i) ∈ E}
and
Ei = {ti ∈ Ti | E−i(ti) 6= ∅}.
Consider an allocation rule x ∈ AN , agent i of type ti and an event E.
Suppose q(E−i(ti)) > 0. Then agent i’s expected utility conditional on E
can be expressed as:
Ui(x|ti, E) =
∑
t−i∈E−i(ti)
q(t−i | ti)
q(E−i(ti)|ti)
ui(xi(t−i, ti), (t−i, ti)).
The corresponding expected utility (conditional on E) if type ti pretends
to be of type t′i, while the others are truth-telling, is:
Ui(x, t
′
i | ti, E) =
∑
t−i∈E−i(ti)
q(t−i | ti)
q(E−i(ti)|ti)
ui(xi(t−i, t
′
i), (t−i, ti)).
Given E ⊆ TN , an S-allocation x ∈ AS is IC over E if for every i ∈ S and
for every ti, t
′
i ∈ Ei:
Ui(x | ti, E) ≥ Ui(x, t′i | ti, E).
In addition, though, a coalition may contemplate the use of random mech-
anisms in order to object to a status quo allocation. The interpretation of
the status quo x ∈ AN is that in every state tN , the outcome is x(tN ), unless
there is an agreement to change it. In particular, if there is an attempt to
change it but the attempt fails, the outcome in state tN is x(tN). As in
the case of complete information, the failure of an objection makes every-
one involved in the objection believe that the original status quo prevails.
With incomplete information, this means that no learning takes place from
the failed attempt. Of course, there are good reasons to explore alternative
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assumptions, and here the generalized Nash program hinted at above should
play an important role.
Thus, to potentially destabilize a status quo, now we also consider ran-
dom plans. A random coalitional plan µ consists of a collection of probability
distributions over feasible allocation rules for various coalitions: µ(S, yS, tN ),
where yS ∈ AS, denotes the probability with which coalition S ⊆ N is receiv-
ing yS ∈ AS when the (reported) state is tN ∈ TN . We shall say that such a
random plan is measurable with respect to coalitional information, or simply
measurable, if for every S, for every yS and for every tS, µ(S, y
S, (tS, t
′
−S)) =
µ(S, yS, (tS, t
′′
−S)) for every t
′
−S, t
′′
−S ∈ T−S. Otherwise, we shall say that the
random plan is non-measurable. While such non-measurabilities are in prin-
ciple possible, we shall always require that, if P is the union of all coalitions
in the support of µ, µ(S, yS, (tP , t
′
−P )) = µ(S, y
S, (tP , t
′′
−P )) for all (S, y
S) in
the support of µ, all tP ∈ TP and all t′−P , t′′−P ∈ T−P .
We think of the random plan as a mediated communication mechanism
used by the members of the coalition P , which follows a pre-specified IC
status quo with its truthful reports behind it. The timing of the random
plan mediated communication mechanism is as follows:
• Stage 1: Types are reported after players have been informed about µ.
Each player is privately informed about the instances in which µ calls
her to act. The type reports of this stage are used only if and when
the blocking plan is implemented.
• Stage 2: players are invited to participate in the blocking plan, i.e.,
“phone calls” are made by the blocking mediator, taking into account
the probabilities µ(S, yS, tN), which use already the types reported
within µ. Note in particular how a non-measurable plan is perfectly
possible, allowing information transmission from coalition to coalition
within µ. On the other hand, the plan must be measurable with respect
to the information of the union of coalitions within µ.
• Stage 3: each agent in the support of µ is asked to either accept or
reject the blocking plan, and he does so in private communications
with the blocking mediator. An allocation proposed to coalition S is
implemented if and only if every agent in S accepts the random plan;
otherwise, the status quo is implemented.
An equilibrium rejection of a status quo is a Bayesian equilibrium of this
communication mechanism in which the random blocking plan is accepted
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over an event that has positive probability. In particular, in the Bayesian
equilibrium: (i) the resulting allocation rule is IC over the equilibrium rejec-
tion event; (ii) each type that accepts being part of the plan prefers accepting
it to rejecting it; and (iii) each type that rejects weakly prefers rejecting it to
accepting it. The core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking is the set of IC allocations
against which there is no equilibrium rejection. It turns out that, if one allows
only deterministic blocking plans that have a single coalition in the support,
this core is the Dutta-Vohra credible core. If one allows random measurable
mechanisms, this core is the Myerson virtual utility core; and if one allows the
use of unrestricted random mechanisms, it is the Serrano-Vohra randomized
mediated core.
Note that, by building these objections on the basis of equilibrium rejec-
tions, information is endogenously transmitted within the random blocking
plan. Given the equilibrium rejection event, each type that is part of the
event wishes to be part of the objection, while types that are not part of the
event wish to stay out and not misrepresent their information to participate
in that plan.
Given the difficulties that follow the result in Vohra (1999), one needs to
find alternative assumptions to establish existence of these interim cores. For
quasilinear economies, and if one allows average feasibility in the numeraire
(while exact feasibility is required for the other goods), Myerson (2007) shows
non-emptiness of the virtual utility core.5 Since his argument does not rely
on the measurability assumption on blocking plans, it follows that the core
w.r.t. equilibrium blocking of unrestricted mechanisms is also non-empty un-
der the same assumptions. Similarly, also in quasilinear economies, if one as-
sumes the existence of an IC ex post core allocation, Dutta and Vohra (2005)
show non-emptiness of the credible core, and again, their arguments can be
adapted to show that the core w.r.t. equilibrium blocking of unrestricted
mechanisms is also non-empty under their assumptions. Understanding the
limitations that these and other conditions may have, the search for alterna-
tive interesting scenarios in which non-emptiness of the core obtains should
also be part of the research agenda.
The question of core convergence at the interim stage leads in general
to a robust negative answer. As shown in Serrano, Vohra and Volij (2001),
the coarse core is “too large” and does not converge to any price equilibrium
5Under standard assumptions, his proof is based on a balancedness condition, which,
as he states, is met in linear exchange economies, but also in two-player Bayesian games.
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notion. This result extends to a number of other core concepts in which the
information is transmitted exogenously, and it is also robust to adding IC
to the feasibility requirements for coalitional allocations. The fine core, at
the other extreme, is often “too small,” as it may be empty in economies in
which standard price equilibrium concepts exist. In quasilinear economies,
though, Kamishiro and Serrano (2011) show that the core w.r.t. equilibrium
blocking of unrestricted mechanisms converges to the corresponding set of ex
post Walrasian equilibrium allocations, while the Myerson virtual utility core
does not. Thus, the measurability of the random blocking plans is a friction
that prevents the full information revelation that one finds in a rational
expectations equilibrium. These results are also robust to environments in
which the IC constraints can be dropped. Given how important it is to
understand information flows in markets, more research along these lines is
definitely needed.6
3 Bayesian Cooperative Games with Orthog-
onal Coalitions
Myerson (1984b) defines a general cooperative game with incomplete infor-
mation as Γ = 〈N, (DS)S∈S , (Ti, ui)i∈N , q〉, where, as in the previous section,
N is the set of players, Ti is the set of types of every player i ∈ N , and q is
the prior probability distribution over TN =
∏
i∈N Ti; DS denotes the set of
feasible decisions for every coalition S, S is the power set of N , and utility
functions are now defined as ui : DN ×TN → IR for every player i, i ∈ N . By
assumption, all the sets DS and Ti are finite and, for every coalitions R, S
such that R ∩ S = ∅, DR × DS ⊆ DR∪S .
This model allows for both informational and strategic externalities, since
the utilities of the members of a coalition S may depend on the types and
the decisions of the players in N \ S. In particular, even under complete
information, namely, if Ti is a singleton for every i, the model is more general
than an NTU characteristic function. Following Myerson (1984b), purely
informational externalities can be captured by assuming that the cooperative
6It is worth mentioning the results in de Clippel (2007), who based on the competitive
framework of Rothschild-Stiglitz and in an ex post verifiable setting, shows convergence
of his type-agent core to an equilibrium notion proposed in Wilson (1978).
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game Γ has orthogonal coalitions, namely that
ui((dS, d−S), tN) = ui((dS, d
′
−S), tN)
for every S, i ∈ S, dS ∈ DS, d−S, d′−S ∈ D−S and tN ∈ TN .
A mechanism for coalition S is a mapping µS : TS → ∆(DS), where
TS =
∏
i∈S Ti, as in section 2, and ∆(DS) denotes the set of probability
distributions over DS. The interpretation is that if S were to form, it would
make a decision in DS randomly, as a function of its members’ information.
7
In order to extend standard cooperative solution concepts, such as the core
or the Shapley value, to games with incomplete information, we will typically
assume that only the grand coalition’s mechanism µN will be implemented.
In this case, for every S 6= N , the mechanism µS stands as a threat, to be
carried out only if N \ S refuses to cooperate with S.
The issue of coalitional threats does not arise in two standard models of
cooperative games with incomplete information (see Myerson (1991, chapter
10)). In a Bayesian collective choice problem Γc = 〈N, DN , (Ti, ui)i∈N , q〉, a
set of joint decisions, DN , is described for the grand coalition N only. In a
Bayesian bargaining problem Γb = 〈N, DN , d∗, (Ti, ui)i∈N , q〉, a disagreement
decision d∗ ∈ DN is made if the players fail to agree on a joint decision in
DN . Both Γ
c and Γb implicitly have orthogonal coalitions.
Whatever the basic model - Γ, Γc or Γb - a mechanism for the grand
coalition N is a mapping µN : TN → ∆(DN ). In this section, we assume
that types are not verifiable and that the players negotiate at the interim
stage. Hence, we require that µN be incentive compatible, which can be de-
fined as in section 2. µN is incentive efficient if and only if µN is IC and there
does not exist any other IC mechanism giving a higher interim expected util-
ity to all types ti of all players i ∈ N . As explained in detail in Holmström
and Myerson (1983), this extension of Pareto efficiency to cooperative games
with incomplete information makes sense if the players must choose a mech-
anism µN after having learnt their type.
8 Incentive efficient mechanisms are
the optimal solutions of a linear programming problem and can be usefully
7As recalled in section 2, deterministic mechanisms are common in exchange economies,
even if random mechanisms have also been considered in that framework (see, e.g., Forges,
Minelli and Vohra (2002)). In the abstract game theoretic framework of sections 3 and
4, the tradition inherited from complete information is to allow for randomization over
finitely many feasible decisions.
8As an illustration, N -allocations in the IC coarse core (see section 2) are incentive
efficient.
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characterized through the dual of this problem, which leads to virtual utilities
for the players (see Myerson (1991), section 10.5). As already suggested by
Myerson (2007)’s core concept (which is introduced for exchange economies
in section 2 but applies to any Bayesian cooperative game with orthogonal
coalitions) and as will be further illustrated below, virtual utilities can be
a useful tool to define and characterize cooperative solution concepts under
incomplete information.
In a Bayesian collective choice problem Γc, it is understood that partic-
ipation is compulsory, but in Γ and Γb, interim individual rationality is a
property to consider, in addition to incentive efficiency. If Γ has orthogonal
coalitions, the definition is straightforward. In particular, in Γb, µN is interim
individually rational if and only if µN gives at least as high interim expected
utility as the disagreement outcome d∗ to all types ti of all players i ∈ N .
We defer a possible general definition of interim individual rationality to the
next section (see (1)).
Harsanyi and Selten (1972) proposed an extension of the Nash solution to
Bayesian bargaining problems, which was later modified by Myerson (1979).
However, Myerson himself acknowledges that this solution concept has sev-
eral drawbacks (see Myerson (1984b)). Building on Myerson (1983), which
assumes that one of the players has the whole bargaining power (see also
Myerson (1991), section 10.7), Myerson (1984a) proposes a new generaliza-
tion of the Nash bargaining solution for two player games with incomplete
information and equal bargaining power.
Myerson (1984a) identifies two axioms for incentive efficient mechanisms:
random dictatorship and extension (see also Myerson (1991), section 10.8).
These axioms turn out to be satisfied by many solution correspondences
B, which associate incentive efficient mechanisms with every two-person
Bayesian bargaining problem. A neutral bargaining solution to Γb is defined
as any (incentive efficient) mechanism µ such that, for every correspondence
B that satisfies the axioms, µ ∈ B(Γb). Myerson (1984a) proves that (i)
neutral bargaining solutions satisfy the two axioms; (ii) the set of neutral
bargaining solutions is nonempty for every two-person Bayesian bargaining
problem; (iii) if Γb is a bargaining problem with complete information, µ is a
neutral bargaining solution of Γb if and only if µ is the Nash bargaining so-
lution of Γb. Myerson (1984a) also characterizes neutral bargaining solutions
in terms of the players’ virtual utilities. Myerson (1985) solves two examples
in full detail.
Myerson (1984b) explains that, in the presence of incentive constraints,
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transferable utility at the interim stage cannot be modelled without refer-
ring to an appropriate NTU framework (see also Forges, Mertens and Vohra
(2002)). He proposes a solution concept that extends Myerson (1984a)’s
bargaining solution and Shapley (1969)’s NTU value for cooperative games
with incomplete information.9 Myerson’s value is not derived from axioms,
but can be computed by performing the fictitious transfers behind Shapley
(1969)’s value in terms of the players’ virtual utilities. As the Shapley NTU
value, Myerson’s solution concept is not single valued. The solutions consist
of incentive compatible mechanisms µN for which there exist virtual utility
scales such that µN would be equitable and efficient if interpersonal com-
parisons could be made in terms of these virtual utility scales. In the same
way as the solution concepts developed in Holmström and Myerson (1983),
Myerson (1983) and Myerson (1984a), Myerson (1984b)’s value reflects the
fact that players negotiate at the interim stage, so that they should take ac-
count of the information that they reveal by proposing, accepting or refusing
a particular IC mechanism.
Myerson’s value involves the identification of a rational threat mecha-
nism µS for every coalition S. Any cooperative game Γ with incomplete
information has a value, which is interim individually rational (in the sense
of (1), see below). Myerson (1984b) further conjectures that his solution set
should be generically finite. However, a satisfactory justification of the ratio-
nal threats, in terms of blocking plans as in section 2, is only available when
Γ has orthogonal coalitions. Even in this case, it is understood that every
coalition S commits to a threat mechanism µS in view of full cooperation,
before knowing which coalition structure will effectively prevail, so that µS
need not be incentive compatible or equitable for S 6= N .
de Clippel (2005) explicitly computes Myerson (1984b)’s value in a three-
person example in which player 1 is the only informed player and player 3’s
only contribution is to facilitate the fulfilment of player 1’s incentive con-
straints in the grand coalition. Contrary to what intuition would suggest,
Myerson’s value treats player 3 as a dummy. Nonetheless, de Clippel (2005)
shows that player 3 gets a positive payoff in a procedure of random arrival,
which can be viewed as a generalization of Myerson (1984a)’s random dic-
tatorship to games with more than two players. de Clippel formalizes the
9Under complete information, several extensions of the Shapley (1953) value have been
proposed in the NTU case: Harsanyi (1959, 1963), Maschler and Owen (1992), Shapley
(1969).
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procedure in a game in extensive form, which accounts for the players’ nego-
tiation possibilities. As a topic for further research, Myerson (1984b)’s value
should be further investigated and challenged.
The previous paragraphs illustrate that, even in the absence of strategic
externalities, the axiomatic approach to cooperation, which was so fruit-
ful under complete information, to date renders much less clear conclusions
when negotiation takes place between privately informed players. As recalled
above, Myerson (1984a) proposes a partial axiomatization of a bargaining
solution in the case of two equally powerful players. Focusing on the issue
of information revelation at the negotiation stage, de Clippel and Minelli
(2004) pursue this analysis. They provide cooperative and noncooperative
characterizations of Myerson (1983, 1984a)’s solutions under the additional
assumption that types become verifiable at the stage where a mechanism is
used to make decisions. de Clippel and Minelli (2004) propose in particular
a refinement of Wilson (1978)’s coarse core. An obvious open problem is the
extension of these results when types remain unverifiable, even at the decision
stage. In any case, this contribution, as other recent ones, e.g., Serrano and
Vohra (2007), detailed in section 2, and de Clippel (2005), indicates that the
analysis of simple, explicit negotiation procedures is a promising approach
given the state of the art.
4 Cooperation in Noncooperative Bayesian
Games
Under complete information, the most natural way to take strategic exter-
nalities into account is to start with a strategic form game. As recalled
in Myerson (1991, section 8.5), one can represent the effects of binding
agreements in a two-person strategic form game by various bargaining prob-
lems, leading for instance to Nash (1953)’s bargaining solution with vari-
able threats. Harsanyi (1959, 1963) extended the latter solution to n-person
games. Many other approaches are conceivable (see, e.g., Ray and Vohra
(1997), Ray (2007) and Hart and Mas-Colell (2010)). Under incomplete in-
formation, the analog of a strategic form game is a noncooperative Bayesian
game G = 〈N, (Ti, Di, ui)i∈N , q〉, where the parameters have the same inter-
pretation as in the previous section, but decision sets Di are now described
for individual players i ∈ N only and DN is defined as DN =
∏
i∈N Di in the
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utility functions ui, i ∈ N .10
As a first step, let us think of a possible characterization of the feasible
set when the players can cooperate in G. As in the previous sections, a
mechanism for the set N of all players is a mapping µN : TN → ∆(DN). As
in section 2, we denote as Ui(µN | ti) the interim expected payoff of player i
of type ti when decisions are made according to µN , namely
Ui(µN | ti) =
∑
t−i∈T−i
q(t−i | ti)
∑
dN∈DN
µN(dN | ti, t−i)ui(dN , (ti, t−i)).
Following Myerson (1991, section 6.6), µN is interim individually rational if
and only if, for every player i ∈ N , there exists a mechanism ν−i : T−i →
∆(D−i) for the players in N \ i such that
Ui(µN | ti) ≥ max
di∈Di
∑
t−i∈T−i
q(t−i | ti)
∑
d−i∈D−i
ν−i(d−i | t−i)ui((di, d−i), (ti, t−i))
(1)
for every ti ∈ Ti.11
Let F(G) be the set of all interim expected payoffs that can be achieved
by means of an incentive compatible, interim individually rational mechanism
µN . The idea is that the players are asked to reveal their types once and for
all, in view of the cooperative agreement µN . Hence, µN , but none of the
ν−i’s, is required to be IC. The set F(G) can be interpreted as the set of all
interim expected payoffs that the players can achieve by signing voluntary,
binding agreements at the interim stage of the Bayesian game G (see Myerson
(1991, sections 6.1 and 6.6, and Forges (2011)). A formal statement of this
property involves some subtleties, even under complete information (see A.
Kalai et al. (2010)). It seems natural to define a cooperative solution for G as
an element of F(G). For instance, as pointed out above, Myerson (1984b)’s
value is interim individually rational in the sense of (1).12
10The current model is thus a particular case of the general cooperative game Γ =
〈N, (DS)S∈S , (Ti, ui)i∈N , q〉 of the previous section, with DS =
∏
i∈S Di, for every S ⊆ N .
As pointed out above, Myerson (1984b)’s value applies to this model but its relevance is
disputable when coalitions are not orthogonal.
11Under complete information, in the case of two players, the corresponding individ-
ual rationality level of player i is the standard, fixed threats, minmax level, namely
minν−i∈∆(D−i) maxdi∈Di
∑
d−i∈D−i ν−i(d−i)ui(di, d−i).
12To see this, let µS be the rational threat of coalition S associated with the underlying
value, take ν−i =
∑
S3i
(|S|−1)!(|N |−|S|)!
|N |! (µS\i, µN\S) and use lemma 2 in Myerson (1984b).
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A. Kalai and E. Kalai (2011) propose a new solution, the cooperative-
competitive (“coco”) solution, for two-person Bayesian games with transfer-
able utility. The coco solution is defined by an explicit, simple formula, in
terms of the players’ ex ante expected payoffs. It is based on a decomposi-
tion of the game G into two components, summarizing (i) what the players
can get as a team and (ii) their respective payoff advantages.13 The coco
solution is ex post Pareto (namely, “first best”) efficient and is monotonic
with respect to both individual decision sets and individual information sets.
By identifying some further axioms, A. Kalai and E. Kalai (2011) provide a
complete characterization of their solution.
In the spirit of the Nash program, A. Kalai and E. Kalai (2011) also
investigate to which extent the coco solution can be implemented at the
ex ante or the interim stage of an appropriately designed game extending G.
Interim implementation is particularly delicate, since we know, from Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983), that there is a tension between ex post Pareto
efficiency, incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality. In order
to show that coco can be implemented at the ex ante (resp., interim) stage,
A. Kalai and E. Kalai (2011) assume that G takes place in an environment of
“weakly (resp., strongly) revealed payoffs”, in which, at the end of the game,
types become verifiable to some extent.14 The latter assumption is similar
to the one made in de Clippel and Minelli (2005), but as seen above, the
latter paper builds on Myerson (1984a), in which, unlike in A. Kalai and E.
Kalai (2011), utilities are nontransferable and the disagreement decision is
fixed. On the other hand, de Clippel and Minelli (2005) address the issue of
the revelation of information at the negotiation stage, while A. Kalai and E.
Kalai (2011)’s interim implementation procedure does not allow the players
to choose among mechanisms.
Myerson (1984b)’s value applies in particular to two-person Bayesian
13The coco solution for player i is easily computed from the parameters of the Bayesian
game G, with N = {1, 2}, as 12
∑
t q(t) maxd [u1(d, t) + u2(d, t)] +
1
2vali(G
ad) where t =
(t1, t2) and d = (d1, d2), Gad is the zero-sum Bayesian game defined as G except that
player i’s utility function is ui − u−i and vali(Gad) denotes the ex ante expected value of
Gad for player i. In particular, under complete information, the coco solution is equal to
the TU bargaining solution with variable threats.
14The coco solution is formally defined only at the ex ante stage so that its interim
individual rationality cannot be assessed directly, that is, without specifying an interim
protocol. To guarantee interim participation in a procedure leading to the coco value,
the key is to design transfers that depend on true types (as opposed to reported types in
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)).
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games and extends Nash’s bargaining solution with variable threats. My-
erson’s value deeply differs from the coco solution since it reflects bargaining
over mechanisms at the interim stage and is thus “second best” efficient by
nature. Nevertheless, a precise comparison of the treatment of threats in the
two papers could be helpful.
A. Kalai and E. Kalai (2011) point out the following open problems: ex-
tension of the coco value in the TU case for more than two players and in the
NTU case for two players or more, and construction of a second best analog
of the coco value for environments that do not satisfy ex post observability
conditions.
Unlike several contributions analyzed in section 2, the papers surveyed
up to now in sections 3 and 4 do not impose any IC requirement on the
mechanism µS to be chosen by a coalition S 6= N , either because they focus
on the two-person case or because they implicitly assume a specific timing in
the coalitions’ commitment process. The formulation of meaningful incentive
compatibility conditions for coalitions S (such that 2 < |S| < |N |) in a
Bayesian noncooperative game can be a real challenge. In the absence of an
ad hoc scenario, we face a circular problem since incentives inside a coalition
should take into account the commitments to threats, and the ability of a
coalition to commit to threats depends on its members’ information.
Biran and Forges (2011) show that the previous problem can be avoided
when informational externalities are limited, i.e., in a Bayesian game G with
independent private values, namely in which q =
⊗
i∈N qi for some qi ∈ ∆(Ti),
i ∈ N , and ui(dN , (ti, t−i)) = ui(dN , ti) for every i ∈ N , dN ∈ DN , (ti, t−i) ∈
TN . Biran and Forges assume that utilities are transferable and that every
coalition S commits to a mechanism µS at the ex ante stage (of course,
µS is used at the interim stage).
15 For every partition Π of the players, they
define a coalitional equilibrium16 relative to Π as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(µS)S∈Π of the auxiliary game in which the players are the coalitions S in
the partition Π, with private information in TS. A coalitional equilibrium
(µS)S∈Π is incentive compatible if and only if, for every S ∈ Π, given that
the players in N \S make decisions according to (µR)R∈Π,R 6=S, µS is IC in the
usual sense. Observe that, if coalition S looks for a “credible” threat given
the coalition structure Π, it must take the behavior of the players in N \ S
15Given the TU framework, µS determines ex post balanced transfers in addition to a
decision in DS .
16Ray and Vohra (1997) and Ray (2007) introduced this solution concept for games with
complete information.
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into account, even if S is not subjected to incentive constraints (e.g, under
complete information, see Ray and Vohra (1997), or if types are verifiable
as early as at the interim stage). The previous definition illustrates that
incentive compatibility for coalitions S such that 2 < |S| < |N | is easy to
formulate in a context where coalitions play best responses to each other.
By relying on the techniques of d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979,
1982), Biran and Forges (2011) prove that every coalitional equilibrium can
be made incentive compatible by means of an appropriate transfer scheme.17
For every partition Π of the players, every coalitional equilibrium relative
to Π generates a cooperative game in partition form. As in section 2 for
exchange economies, once the ex ante cooperative game is well-defined (here,
as a partition form game), it can be solved as under complete information.
Proceeding in this way, Biran and Forges (2011) propose a core solution
concept which, recalling the core concepts introduced in section 2, can be
interpreted as an ex ante IC, sequentially rational, α-core, the sequential ra-
tionality being inherited from the absence of incredible threats in a coalitional
equilibrium. This core is shown to be nonempty in standard first price and
second price auctions. Independent private values in the basic game G and
ex ante commitment of coalitions play a crucial role in the previous results
and relaxation of these assumptions is an obvious topic for future research.
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